辟谣失灵是谣言治理过程中的一个重要研究话题，目前大多数研究发现人们往往对负面信息赋予更多的关注，导致了辟谣无效的现象，其内在机理尚未清晰。与此同时，偶有个例显示出相关主体在遭受负面谣言时，不仅可以全身而退，甚至借势成功，这类成功辟谣的行为往往消弥危害于事前，样本数量稀少，导致了人们对谣言逆转相关研究的不足。本文从网民的风险偏好和信任偏好出发，构建博弈模型进行分析，旨在探索人们对负面信息关注和传播偏好的形成机理以及辟谣失灵的内在规律。结果表明，人们关注正面消息还是负面消息，取决于事件的模糊状态以及人们的风险偏好。人们对谣言信息的处理行为影响了受众的信任偏好形成，受众对信息的信任程度相对较高时，辟谣行为往往不能奏效，降低受众对谣言的信任，实现辟谣激励机制，可以改善辟谣无效的困境。该结论尝试解释辟谣失灵的内在规律并给出相应的措施，可以为人们治理谣言提供一定的借鉴。

The failure of rumor refutation is a significant research topic in the process of rumor governance. Most studies have found that people tend to pay more attention to negative information, leading to the ineffectiveness of refutation efforts. The underlying mechanisms of this phenomenon remain unclear. Meanwhile, there are occasional cases where the involved parties not only manage to escape the negative impact of rumors but also leverage the situation to their advantage. These successful refutation behaviors often mitigate harm in advance, but the scarcity of such cases has led to insufficient research on rumor reversal.This paper constructs a game theory model based on peoples’ risk preferences and trust preferences to analyze the formation mechanisms of attention and dissemination preferences towards negative information, as well as the intrinsic rules of refutation failure. The results indicate that whether people focus on positive or negative messages depends on the ambiguity of the event and their risk preferences. People’s handling of rumor information influences the formation of the audience’s trust preferences. When the audience’s trust in the information is relatively high, refutation efforts often fail. Reducing the audience’s trust in rumors and implementing a refutation incentive mechanism can improve the dilemma of ineffective refutation.This conclusion attempts to explain the intrinsic rules of refutation failure and provides corresponding measures, offering some reference for people in rumor governance.